Income Taxation and Commuting Expenses Tax Policy and the Need for Nonsimplistic Analysis of Simple Problemsl by Klein, William A.
Cornell Law Review
Volume 54
Issue 6 July 1969 Article 2
Income Taxation and Commuting Expenses Tax
Policy and the Need for Nonsimplistic Analysis of
Simple Problemsl
William A. Klein
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/clr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Cornell Law Review by an authorized administrator of Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. For more information, please
contact jmp8@cornell.edu.
Recommended Citation
William A. Klein, Income Taxation and Commuting Expenses Tax Policy and the Need for Nonsimplistic Analysis of Simple Problemsl,
54 Cornell L. Rev. 871 (1969)
Available at: http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/clr/vol54/iss6/2
INCOME TAXATION AND COMMUTING




Should any or all commuting expenses be deductible for purposes
of personal income taxation? The present federal income tax provision
covering this issue is the broad one that allows the deduction of "all
the ordinary and necessary expenses" of a "trade or business" with
certain expenses, including "traveling expenses . . . while away from
home in the pursuit of a trade or business,"1 expressly brought within
the ambit of this catch-all phrase. Setting the boundaries of the phrase
"traveling expenses ... away from home" has required considerable
litigation and has resulted in much legalistic refinement,2 but for
present purposes broad doctrinal generalities will suffice.
At one end of the spectrum is the pure and simple case of the
ordinary commuter who drives or takes public transportation to his
job and back home every day. It is clear that his transportation expense
is not and never has been deductible. 3 It has generally been assumed
t Professor of Law, University of Wisconsin. A.B. 1952, LL.B. 1957, Harvard University.
1 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 162. Also of relevance is § 262, the negative counterpart
of § 162, disallowing deduction of "personal, living, or family expenses."
2 See, e.g., 4A J. MERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL INcoNE TAXATION §§ 25.91-100, at 329-78
(rev. ed. 1966); Haddleton, Traveling Expenses "Away from Home," 17 TAx L. Rlv. 261
(1962); McDonald, Travel and Entertainment Expenses, N.Y.U. 11TH INST. ON FED. TAX.
1173 (1953); Venuti, A Taxpayer's Home-A Matter of Choice, 17 DE PAUL L. REv. 278
(1968); Comment, Living Expenses While "Away from Home": Business or Personal?,
19 U. Cm. L. REV. 534 (1952); Note, A House Is Not a Tax Home, 49 VA. L. REv. 125 (1963),
8 See Treas. Reg. §§ 1.162-2(e), 1.262-1(b)(5) (1958); 4A J. MERTENS, supra note 2, at 350-
58. But see Wright v. Hartsell, 305 F.2d 221 (9th Cir. 1962); Trauferner v. United States, 68-I
U.S. Tax Cas. 9212 (D. Utah Feb. 13, 1968). In Hartsell the court allowed deduction of the
transportation expenses of a construction worker incurred in traveling daily from his
home to a temporary job at an isolated Atomic Energy Commission site some 70 miles
away. The court also allowed a deduction for the amount it would have cost to travel daily
between the job site and the nearest habitable town (a distance of 46 miles) when the
taxpayer's job was of indefinite (as opposed to temporary) duration and when he was in
fact traveling the greater distance (70 miles) between the place where he actually lived and
the job site. The court reasoned that the expense should be deductible because it was not
feasible to move nearer to the job site. Although this reasoning seems to support a deduc-
tion in any case in which the job is temporary and the distance great, such a rule would
represent a radical departure from prior law, and the court did not purport to be foment-
ing a revolution. Thus, the holding should probably be limited by the peculiar facts that the
job site was a very substantial distance from the nearest habitation and that the court
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that the correctness of this result is a self-evident consequence of the
fact that the decision to live in any particular place is a purely "per-
sonal" decision. From this it is reasoned (illogically, as will be seen4)
that a decision to live at a great distance from one's job is a purely
"personal" decision which includes the decision to incur a commuting
expense for the satisfaction of personal tastes, and that such expense,
having nothing to do with business, should not be deductible. This
rationale accounts for one of the few exceptions to the rule disallowing
deduction of commuting expenses, the case in which housing is liter-
ally not available except at a very substantial distance from the job
site.5
At the other end of the spectrum is the "travel expense" (a term
of art in taxation) such as the expense of transportation, food, and lodg-
ing incurred by a traveling salesman while on the road or by any other
businessman while on an occasional business trip. These expenses are
and clearly ought to be deductible. Problems arise, however, because
of the notion that for tax purposes one is expected to minimize his
expenses by living next door to his job,6 with any expenses resulting
from a different decision being regarded as "personal." This has led
to the general rule that one's "home" is his principal place of work,
regardless of where he lives in fact, so that the only deductible travel
expenses are those incurred while away from one's principal place of
work. But inasmuch as one cannot reasonably be expected to move his
residence every time he takes a new "temporary" job, there is an
exception to the effect that a "temporary" job (generally one expected
to last less than a year) does not result in a shift of the tax "home" to
the job site.7 Thus a construction worker who usually works in Chicago
and maintains his home there and who takes a two-month job in Madi-
son, Wisconsin (a distance of 150 miles), can deduct the cost of getting
to Madison and back to Chicago (one round trip) and the cost of living
directed its attention almost exclusively to the taxpayer's temporary job. See Arthur
Sansone, 41 T.C. 277 (1963); Rev. Rul. 54-497, 1954-2 Cum BuLL. 75, 81. Even as so
limited, the case is out of tune with the general rule that commuting expenses are not
deductible.
4 See pp. 876-79 infra. Basically, the illogic stems from the implicit insertion of the
unwarranted assumption that the location of one's job is fixed and the location of his
home variable, and not vice versa.
5 See note 3 supra.
6 This expectation seems curiously inconsistent with the limitations imposed by
traditional zoning laws.




in Madison. But if the job is expected to last for more than a year, no
deduction is allowed, even if the worker retains his Chicago residence.
Although these rules seem sensible, they produce some anomalous
and disturbing results that raise serious doubts about their soundness.
Suppose our Chicago-based construction worker takes a three-day job
at Belvidere, Illinois, a distance of about seventy miles from his home.
Suppose his home, like his Belvidere job site, is adjacent to a toll road
interchange, so that the trip is an easy one. Suppose further that it
would cost ten dollars a night to stay at Belvidere and nine dollars a day
to commute. Except for tax considerations he would be better off finan-
cially to commute. But suppose he is in a thirty percent tax bracket.
If he stays at Belvidere, he will be entitled to deduct his ten dollar
expense," and his net cost will be only seven dollars. On the other hand,
the nine dollar commuting cost will be his net cost, since it is not
deductible. If the man is sufficiently tax conscious and sufficiently con-
cerned about money, the tax effect could alter his decision in favor of
the more expensive alternative. Yet this result is economically unsound
and servesno apparent social objective. And even if a special rule could
be devised for this kind of case, it nonetheless raises the basic question:
Why are traveling expenses and commuting expenses treated differently?
What difference between them is significant for tax purposes?
Take another example. Suppose a husband and wife both work
but have jobs far apart. Suppose they live near the husband's job, so
that the wife has a long commute. Does it seem fair or helpful to say
that the wife's commuting expense is a consequence of her purely
"personal" decision to marry and live with her husband? Is her deci-
sion to marry and live with her husband not different in nature from
a single woman's decision to live in a neighborhood far from her job
simply because she likes it there and would not be happy anywhere
else? Will not the nondeductibility of commuting expenses in such
cases sometimes tip the scales in favor of taking a job nearer home? If
so, will not the tax system thereby effect a purposeless distortion of
the allocation of human resources?
A final hypothetical casts even more doubt on the commuting
expense rule. Suppose a man has been unemployed and has been receiv-
ing welfare payments, and is then offered a one-day job paying fifteen
dollars that requires a four dollar outlay for commuting. If he takes the
job (and let us assume that welfare practice is such that he will be re-




quired to do so), his welfare stipend will be reduced by the full amount
of his net earnings. In traditional welfare practice, however, the amount
by which his welfare stipend will be reduced is eleven dollars (fifteen
dollars earned less the four dollars' commuting expense). In our welfare
system the four dollars' commuting expense is regarded as a cost of earn-
ing the income. The rule is obviously a sensible one, since failure to
allow the deduction would mean that by taking the job the man would
be worse off financially than he would be if he refused the job. Why is
the commuting expense considered a cost of earning income by the wel-
fare system but not by the tax system? Is the propriety of the "deduc-
tion" for welfare purposes solely a function of the job's being short-
term, so that moving closer to it is not feasible? Or are there other cir-
cumstances in which the offset would seem equally appropriate and, if
so, what are they?
This article will develop an analytic framework within which the
kinds of issues raised by these hypothetical cases may be intelligently
examined. The focus is on commuting expenses, but the issues raised
in this area merge with the issues presented in cases involving travel
expenses, since the facts in each area tend to merge at the middle of a
spectrum and since the assumptions that have led to the denial of a
deduction for commuting expense are similar, if not identical, to those
that have led to the rules governing travel expense. In fact, the question
posed in many of the cases is whether a given expense is, on the one
hand, a travel expense or, on the other hand, a commuting expense.
Since the nondeductibility of pure and simple commuting expenses
rests on long and firmly established legal doctrine, any suggestions
emerging from the discussion of such expenses should be addressed to
Congress. When the discussion relates to a case in which the expense is
arguably either a commuting expense or a travel expense, however, we
are in the arena of administrative and judicial policy or practice.
I
THE "MOTIVATION" TEST
The leading case of Commissioner v. Flowers9 involves unusual
facts, but like many such cases it serves as a good vehicle for discussion.
The taxpayer, Flowers, lived and practiced law in Jackson, Mississippi.
In 1927 he was offered a full-time job with a railroad whose main
offices were about 250 miles away in Mobile, Alabama, but he did not
9 326 U.S. 465 (1946).
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want to move from Jackson. It was finally agreed that he would take the
job but could continue to live in Jackson, with the understanding that
he would bear personally any costs incurred in traveling to Mobile. 0
The court of appeals opinion 1 emphasized that there was a good busi-
ness reason for Flowers to maintain his home in Jackson: He might lose
his job with the railroad and would then need his contacts there to re-
establish his law practice. Whatever force this suggestion might have
had initially, however, any business connections in Jackson were surely
insignificant by 1939 and 1940, the tax years in question. Thus, we
can assume that this was a case in which the decision to live in Jackson
rather than in Mobile was dictated solely by personal preference for
Jackson, and that but for this preference the expenses in question would
not have been incurred. However, it could also be said that but for the
decision to switch to the presumably higher-paying job in Mobile the
expenses likewise would not have been incurred.
The Supreme Court held that the Commissioner had properly
denied the deduction. Had it done so solely on the ground that com-
muting expenses have never been deductible and that all that was in-
volved in Flowers was a long commute, the opinion would simply
represent a relatively unimpeachable example of the application of the
doctrine of stare decisis. But this was not what the Court did. Instead,
it justified the result on the ground that the expenses "were incurred
solely as the result of the taxpayer's desire to maintain a home in Jack-
son while working in Mobile."'12 The trouble with this statement is
that it is just as sensible to turn it around and say, "The expenses were
incurred solely as a result of the taxpayer's decision to take a job in
Mobile while maintaining his home in Jackson." The Court went on
to state its rationale in somewhat more general terms: "The exigencies
of business rather than the personal conveniences and necessities of the
traveler must be the motivating factors."' 3 Thus the Court suggested
that the outcome should turn on the taxpayer's state of mind-on
"motivating factors"-but failed to spell out what kind of mental
1o Since Flowers had a railroad pass (Record, p. 18, Commissioner v. Flowers, 326 U.S.
465 (1946) (unreported tax court opinion)), his expenses were limited to lodging in Mobile
and food there and en route. The Court, however, treated the case as if it involved trans-
portation costs as well as living expenses. Analytically this is sound enough, since the two
kinds of expense raise the same issue.
One of the anomalies of the present law is that although the government would not
have allowed the deduction of railroad fares in this kind of case, it did not treat the
value of the railroad pass as income in kind. See 0]). 946, 4 Cums. BuLL. 110 (1921).
11 148 F.2d 163 (5th Cir. 1945), rev'd, 326 U.S. 465 (1946).
12 326 U.S. at 473.
13 Id. at 474.
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phenomenon is relevant and why. It also invoked a vague concept of
causation, using the term "exigencies," but again avoided the task
of explaining the precise content of the concept and its application to
the facts of the case. In short, the opinion is weasel-worded. Problems of
motivation and causation are difficult and elusive. To dispose of them
at the level of glib generality is merely to mask confusion. But the
concepts may be relevant and the confusion must be dispelled. We must
ask what conclusions or inferences can properly be drawn from the
decision.
In the first place, the Court cannot have meant that the expense in
Flowers is equivalent to an expense-such as for vacations, fur coats,
sporting goods, and other nonessentials-that has no other function
than the satisfaction of personal desires and would be incurred wholly
independently of any job. No exposition is needed to establish that
such expenses should not be deductible. But transportation expenses
are different; "but for" the necessity of getting to a job they would
not be incurred. A closer analogy is the food and lodging expense of a
working man. It can be argued that these expenses are in part a cost
of earning income, for the obvious reason that one must stay alive
and reasonably healthy in order to work. Nondeductibility of such
expenses can be defended on either of two grounds. First, the basic
expense of personal maintenance falls equally on all income earners
and is adequately accounted for by the $600 per person personal exemp-
tion.14 Second, basic maintenance expenses would be incurred even if
the individual had no job; they do not increase significantly as employ-
ment is accepted. But neither of these arguments explains why commut-
ing expenses are not deductible.
Obviously, then, the Court was dealing with an expense that has
a substantial connection with the taxpayer's business. We must there-
fore pose the following questions: What can-be said about the precise
nature of this causal nexus to income-earning activity and, more im-
portant, how should it be accounted for, if at all, in our policy on the
deductibility of commuting expenses? As noted earlier, the Court stated
that the expenses "were incurred solely as the result of the taxpayer's"'' 5
personal decision to live in Jackson. As has already been suggested, how-
ever, this is simply not so in a purely causative sense. In order for the
expense to arise there must have been two decisions-to work in Mobile
and to live in Jackson. Thus, if the Court's causative concept was one
of necessary conditions, its statement that the personal decision was the
14 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 151.
15 326 U.S. at 473 (emphasis added).
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sole necessary condition was plainly wrong. Nor does it make much.
sense in the context of Flowers to suggest that the decision to live in
Jackson was the sole "motivating"' 6 factor. As already indicated, the
precise content of the concept of motivation and its application to the
facts of this case are not spelled out. Moreover, the opinion in general
is not cast in terms of inquiries into the elusive phenomenon of the
individual taxpayer's state of mind.17 But if a serious, thorough effort-
to fathom the taxpayer's psyche had been attempted, the Court might
well have been constrained to allow the deduction. This suggestion is
derived from one of the central concepts of the present article: It is
highly pertinent and useful to try to determine whether the location of
the home, and of the job, is fixed or variable. There are of course infi-
nite degrees of flexibility in the individual decision on location of job
and home. For the present, however let us examine taxpayer Flowers's
circumstances and speculate as to his probable thought processes.
Three aspects of Flowers's situation are most relevant, First, he had
established his home in Jackson before he was offered the job in
Mobile. Second, since he had a job in Jackson, he had the very reason-
able option of turning down the Mobile job offer. Finally, he seems to
have been very strongly personally committed to maintaining his
home in Jackson. From these facts it is not possible to infer with cer-
tainty the taxpayer's mental processes, but some inferences seem more
reasonable than others.
The least likely possibility is that once the taxpayer was offered the
job in Mobile he knew he wanted it and would take it, that he then
considered the open question of where he would live, weighing the cost
and inconvenience of commuting, and finally decided that on balance
he loved Jackson enough that he would live there. In other words, it is
possible but unlikely that in his mind the job was fixed and the loca-
tion of his home was variable. It is also possible, and seems far more
likely, that he was so strongly committed to living in Jackson (given the
job opportunities available to him there) that he never considered
moving and that the open question for him, having decided that the
job in Mobile represented a career improvement, was whether that
career gain was worth the financial and personal burden of commuting.
In other words, it seems likely that the location of his home was fixed
in his own mind, and the job variable. This would make his situation
16 See pp. 875-76 supra.
17 On the problems involved in such inquiries see Blum, Motive, Intdn4 and Purpose
in Federal Income Taxation, 34 U. Cim. L. REv. 485 (1967); Klein, The Deductibility of
Transportation Expenses of a Combination Business and Pleasure Trip-A Conceptual
Analysis, 18 STAN. L. REv. 1099, 1108 (1966).
1969]
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
similar to those illustrated earlier,18 involving the construction worker,
the welfare recipient with short-term job offers, and the working wife.
Of course, it is even more likely that both the job and the home loca-
tion were variables but that his mental process was much closer to the
second hypothesis than to the first. In any event, if the case is viewed
in these terms, it is nonsensical to assert unequivocally that the expenses
were incurred "as the result of" a decision involving only personal var-
iables, or even a decision involving predominately personal variables.
Thus the only meaningful generality that can safely be used to
describe the expenses and the personal objective of living at a con-
siderable distance from work in a case like Flowers is the following:
The personal objective was a necessary condition to incurring the ex-
pense and Flowers's choice of Jackson as his home did in fact give
him significant personal satisfaction. The correctness of the result is
not self-evident from this description, however. The presence of per-
sonal conditions or satisfactions in a decision to incur an expense does
not always defeat its claim to deductibility as a business expense. For
example, when a taxpayer leaves his home base on a business trip he
can decide to fly first class, stay at a reasonably luxurious hotel, and eat
at good restaurants. There is no tax provision or practice that disallows
the deduction of any expense in excess of the cost of flying tourist
class, staying at the YMCA, and eating at lunch counters. If it is the
taxpayer's personal style to go first class all the way, that is accepted. In
effect, we accept, albeit perhaps not consciously or expressly, the view
that he is committed to his life style, which is taken as given or, in the
terms used earlier, fixed. We treat the extra cost of going first class as
being the nonvariable and inevitable consequence of the necessity of
making a business trip-despite the fact that the extra expenses would
not have been incurred by a person with simpler tastes and that there-
fore personal preferences or idiosyncracies were a necessary condition
to incurring those expenses. In other words, for this kind of issue we
take the individual as we find him, while for commuting expenses we
do not take the individual where we find him.
The foregoing discussion should establish that the question of
whether commuting expenses should be deductible is not an easy one
and that the soundness of our present rules is not self-evident. To un-
derstand the problem better it will be necessary to delineate appro-
priate policy criteria, to demonstrate that in relation to these criteria
not all commuting expenses are alike, and to examine various proto-
typic possibilities in terms of these criteria. It seems unnecessary to
18 See pp. 872-74 supra.
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refer to all meaningful criteria of tax policy; only three are pertinent.
These three are economic neutrality, equity, and administrability.
II
ECONOMIC NEUTRALITY
The best analytic starting point is an appraisal of the deduction
of commuting expenses in light of economic neutrality. The theoreti-
cal underpinning for economic neutrality as a criterion of tax policy is
the idea that ordinarily any distortion of the allocation of resources
that would be generated by uncontrolled market decisions represents
a deviation from the economic optimum. This is a much hedged and
highly over-simplified statement; the articulation and application of a
criterion of tax policy based on this economic concept can be an
extraordinarily refined and uncertain process. Since, however, our
present concern is with a relatively simple problem, and since the
present analysis is intended to be suggestive, not dispositive, a simple
version of the criterion seems adequate: A tax rule offends the goal
of economic neutrality if, all other things being equal, decisions affect-
ing the use or allocation of resources are different when the tax rule
is in effect than they would be in the absence of tax considerations.
Obviously, a tax rule that offends the criterion of economic neutrality
may be justified if it serves some other economic, social, or politi-
cal goal. But if no worthwhile goal is served, a provision that is not
economically neutral is a bad provision. Thus, if the nondeductibility
of commuting expenses would tip the scales in favor of certain taxpay-
ers' taking jobs near their homes, rather than jobs farther away that
would have been more attractive in the absence of tax considerations,
then nondeductibility represents a departure from economic neutral-
ity.10 If there is no good social or other justification for thus altering
the dictates of uncontrolled personal preference and market forces, the
deduction should be allowed. On the other hand, if allowing the deduc-
tion would tip the scales in favor of, say, moving from the city to the
suburbs, then the deduction would produce an inefficient economic
19 It might seem that non-deductibility in such a case is economically neutral because
the commuting cost, even in the absence of a tax system, would tend to induce one to
take a job near his home. However, if we assume that a "near" job pays just enough less
than a "far" job, so as to make the choice an even one in the absence of taxatibn, the
increase in taxable income, and therefore in tax, that would result from taking the "far"
job (commuting expenses being nondeductible), tips the scales in favor of the "near" job.
See pp. 881-83 infra.
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allocation in the form of excessive use of transportation facilities. What
follows is a more detailed examination of these and other economic
effects and the circumstances that would tend to produce them.
Like the Supreme Court in Flowers, courts and commentators
approaching the problem of travel versus commuting make the implicit
assumption that a person invariably decides first where he will work
and then, with that decision made, considers the options of living near
to or at some distance from his job. In other words, it is assumed that
there really is no choice as to job location but that there is as to home
location. Only with this assumption does it make sense to speak of the
cost of commuting as a purely personal expense. If, for purposes of
analyzing the commuting expense in terms of economic neutrality, we
make the same assumption, the nondeductibility of commuting expenses
is consistent with economic neutrality.
Two examples will demonstrate this.20 Take the case of a man tied
to a job in the city, all of whose potential employers are also tied to
city locations, who finds living in the city and living in the suburbs
equally attractive disregarding cost considerations. Suppose further that
housing in the city would cost $2,000 per year, that comparable housing
in the suburbs would cost $1,500, that transportation to the suburbs
would cost $600, and that all other financial factors are neutral or
balanced. The case is an unusual one in that the decision is very close.
Both under the present law and in the absence of any tax system, how-
ever, the choice will be to live in the city. Living in the city provides
the taxpayer with the same satisfactions he would have from living in
the suburbs, but leaves him an extra $100 to spend on additional satis-
factions. On the other hand, if the commuting expense were deductible
and if he were in a twenty-five percent tax bracket, his net transporta-
tion cost would be $450 ($600 less the $150 tax savings), so that the total
cost of living in the suburbs would be $1,950. Thus, by living in the
suburbs, he would be $50 better off than in the city. He would also be
$50 better off than he would be in the absence of any tax system; he
would be living in the suburbs,which is equally as attractive as the city,
but his total cost would be $50 less. But while this taxpayer would be
$50 better off under a rule allowing the deduction, the government,
which ultimately means other taxpayers, would be $150 the loser. Even
if a redistribution of income from the public at large to our putative
taxpayer could be justified on distributional grounds, which it cannot,
20 The fixed-variable analysis developed here may be thought of as one version of
causative analysis. If so, it has the virtue of avoiding the confusion created by a case like
Flowers; it isolates and delineates a particular concept of causation and demonstrates
how that concept bears on tax-policy analysis.
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it could not be justified in terms of efficiency; a $150 loss in satisfactions
for taxpayers in general would have been traded for a $50 gain in
satisfactions for one. Looking at the same point from a slightly different
angle, the $150 tax saving is like a subsidy for living in the suburbs.
Suppose that we have no social, political, or other reason for preferring
to have people move to the suburbs, but that we have somehow allotted
a $150 subsidy to our hypothetical taxpayer. We could either give the
$150 to him outright or give it to him on the condition that he live in
the suburbs. Obviously he would be better off if we gave it to him out-
right. He would then live in the city and have $150; if the payment
were tied to living in the suburbs, he would live there and have a net
of only $50 after sultracting the added $100 cost of obtaining equal
satisfaction. In short, the deductibility of the expense produces a result
that is $100 less than optimum.
To demonstrate the generality of the foregoing, consider a varia-
tion of the facts. Suppose again that a man in a twenty-five percent tax
bracket is tied to a job in the city and is trying to decide whether to live
there or in .the suburbs. But now suppose that it would cost $1500 for
housing either in the city or in thesuburbs, that transportation to the
suburbs would cost $600 per year, and that he has a substantial prefer-
ence for the suburbs. We can quantify this preference by asking how
much extra cost he is willing to incur to live in the suburbs. Suppose
that with the transportation cost at $600 he will live in the city, but
that if it were $400 he would live in the suburbs and if it were $500 the
choice would be a matter of indifference to him. We can now say that
he values the extra satisfaction of living in the suburbs at $500. Under
the present tax system or under a no-tax system he would live in the
city, but if a deduction were allowed he would live in the suburbs.
The analysis supporting this conclusion is essentially the same as before
and need not be repeated. Allowing the deduction would offend the
goal of economic neutrality.
The analysis of these two hypotheticals has been short-run. Many
changes might occur in the long run, but the general conclusion con,
cerning economic neutrality would be the same. For example, the effect
of allowing the deduction and inducing some migration to the suburbs
would be, in the long run, to drive up the cost of suburban real estate
relative to the cost of city real estate and thereby reduce the extent of
the migration. But the effect of the change in relative prices would be
spread over all persons choosing between the city and the suburbs and
the distortion of the elements of their choice would produce a less'
than-optimal result.
Now let us examine the economic effects of deductibility when it
1969]
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is assumed that in the mind of the taxpayer residence is fixed and the
job variable. Situations in which this set of assumptions seems unavoid-
able or at least reasonable already have been cited: the case of the con-
struction worker, the working wife, and the Flowers case. To illustrate
the economic effects, assume that Flowers was irrevocably committed to
living in Jackson, that he was earning $20,000 a year there, that the job
in Mobile paid $26,000, that the annual commuting cost was $5,000,
that Flowers's marginal tax rate was forty percent, and that Flowers en-
joyed traveling enough so that the train rides and the necessity of spend-
ing some time in Mobile were neutral factors. In the absence of any tax
considerations Flowers would take the job in Mobile, since by doing
so he would increase his disposable income by $1,000. This is the
desirable result from an economic standpoint. The value of his con-
tribution to the economy is $6,000 higher in Mobile than in Jackson.
If he takes the job in Mobile, no other person is any worse off; others
would be paying $6,000 more but presumably would be receiving serv-
ices worth at least an additional $6,000. If the market had been operat-
ing properly, Flowers's services in Jackson were not worth more than
$20,000 and could be replaced for that amount. It would be economic-
ally inefficient for him to continue work in Jackson, just as it would
be economically inefficient for a cabinet-maker to do rough carpentry
work at four dollars an hour if he could instead do fine cabinetry at
six dollars an hour. Thus, if economic neutrality were the sole criterion
of social policy, a tax system which induced Flowers to reject the job in
Mobile would be indefensible. Yet the present tax system will produce
precisely this effect. If Flowers were to take the job in Mobile, his in-
come, on the assumed facts, would increase by $6,000 but his expenses
would increase by $7,400 ($5,000 in commuting expenses plus $2,400
in additional tax liability). The choice confronting him under the
present system is precisely analogous to that which he would be con-
fronted with if he were offered another job in Jackson at an earnings
increase of $6,000 and if he were told that the tax rate on the increase
would be 123 percent. Economic neutrality can be achieved only by
allowing a deduction for the commuting expense.
In the Flowers setting the assumption that the residence is fixed
is only a reasonable likelihood. Other instances can easily be cited in
which the same assumption is not only reasonable but necessary. A con-
struction worker may be confronted with a choice between two short-
term jobs, one near home and one at a distance of fifty miles paying a
higher rate. If the job is to last for only a month or so, he will not con-
sider moving his residence. The economic consequences of nondeducti-
bility of commuting expenses will be the same as those just described;
[Vol. 54:871
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on certain reasonable assumptions about wage differentials and costs
of commuting the present tax system will induce a less-than-optimal
economic result. The same is true in the case of a working couple; one
of them is inevitably confronted with a residence that is fixed and
therefore with a job location choice that can easily be distorted by the
tax system.
The preceding discussion of economic neutrality is little more than
an analytic model. By itself it tells us nothing about the likely aggregate
economic effects of the present rule generally disallowing the deduc-
tion of commuting expenses. Unfortunately, the information needed
to make even the crudest kinds of economic predictions is simply not
available. If, however, we could identify those people for whom the
location of residence is fixed and job location is an open question and
those people for whom the opposite is true, and if we wanted to promote
the goal of economic neutrality, we would allow a deduction to the
former and not to the latter. For those falling in neither group this
criterion points in neither direction.
Failure to follow the dictates of economic neutrality in this area
is hardly a matter for great national concern. The money value of a
tax deduction will rarely be large in relation to other financial factors.
The Flowers case, particularly under the facts assumed for purposes of
illustration, was unusual in this respect. Thus, the number of cases in
which the tax factor will make a difference is likely to be small, and
even in such cases the shift from one job to another will be a shift to
only a very slightly inferior economic position. But this kind of obser-
vation may be misleading, since it ignores the size of the economic
effect in relation,to the amount of tax revenue involved; in this per-
spective, the economic effect may seem quite substantial. In other words,
the economic waste resulting from the nondeductibility of commuting
expenses by construction workers on short-term jobs may not be large
in relation to total wages and other costs of such jobs, and the tax
revenue causing the waste may itself be small, but the economic waste
may be very large in relation to the amount of tax revenue. A rule is
offensive to sound economic policy although it has relatively minor
aggregate economic effects if the cost of the change is small.
III
EQuiTY
The next criterion to be applied to the question of whether coin,
muting expenses should be deductible is equity. In its simplest terms,
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this criterion dictates that people with equal incomes should be taxed
equally. Money income or its equivalent is selected as the standard
for determining equality because we are concerned with capacity to
contribute to societal costs, and income is thought to be the fairest
measure of that capacity. The concept of income for tax purposes must
also be reasonably objective; highly individualized assessments would
be anathema in our society.2 1 Thus, the calculation of income for tax
purposes does not take into account psychic benefits, at least not
directly, even when they might have substantial economic value, For
example, considetl two equally qualified lawyers, both avid skiers, One
takes a job in Aspen, Colorado, where he can ski frequently in his
spare time; the other takes a higher-paying job in Chicago and uses all
of his extra income to pay for skiing trips to Aspen. In a sense, the
Chicago lawyer is no better off financially than the Aspen lawyer and it
might be argued that for tax purposes the incomes of these two individ-
uals are the same But it does not seem feasible to design a politically
acceptable tax system that could account for this kind of psychic factor.
We do not add to the Aspen lawyer's income the value of his proximity
to skiing or the amount by which his income could have been increased
by working in Chicago, nor do we try to account for the same factor
by allowing the Chicago lawyer to deduct the cost of his trips to Aspen.
This is not to say, however, that the differential cost of achieving equal
satisfaction is irrelevant to equity or that this factor should be ignored
if it can be indirectly accounted for by fashioning a rule that raises no
problems of administration.
Even after we have decided to ignore psychic elements and to con-
centrate on money income, we are faced with a difficult task in deter-
mining what kinds of receipts should be included, and what kinds of
expenditures deducted, in arriving at income subject to taxation. The
income tax is a tax on net, not gross, income. The costs of producing
gross receipts must be offset against those gross receipts in arriving
at the amount subject to income taxation because to the extent of those
costs the gross receipts are not at the taxpayer's disposal for the purpose
of paying taxes. We alto allow a deduction for medical expenses of a
taxpayer's nonworking dependents-presumably on the analogous
theory that medical expenses are unavoidable and that therefore the
income used to buy medical treatment is not at the disposal of the tax-
payer for the purpose of paying taxes.
21 See Klein, "From the Thoughtful Tax Man," 44 TAxrS 461 (1966); Klein, Federal




Commuting expenses create a problem because they cannot readily
be categorized. Are they expenses of earning income; are the amounts
expended never available to the taxpayer for other, personal purposes?
This is perhaps an indirect way of asking whether commuting costs
are business expenses. But the indirectness is justified because it sensi-
tizes us to the fact that the answer will depend upon our attitudes and
assumptions about the choices available to the commuting employee
and upon what kinds of comparison we draw.
The case of the construction worker with a series of short-term jobs
will again be useful for illustration. Consider the man who lives with
his family in Chicago and takes a two-month job in Belvidere. Suppose
the cost of getting to work and back each day is eight dollars. He will no
doubt regard this expense as wholly unavoidable, as the direct con-
sequence of a decision in which the job itself was the only variable, and
therefore as a cost of earning his wages-in other words as a business
expense. If he earns forty dollars a day, all that is reasonably subject to
his disposal is thirty-two dollars. But since we are now focusing on
equity, we must ask how others will feel. The question then arises;
which "others"? A second construction worker who lives next door to
our Chicago-Belvidere commuter and has the same feeling of attach-
ment to his home, but who has a job in Chicago, would in all probability
share the view that the proper standard of comparison between them is
wages after allowance for the commuting cost. If the second worker
were earning only thirty-two dollars a day in Chicago he would prob-
ably consider the first worker no richer than himself. But what about a
third worker who lives in a mobile home that he moves from Chicago
to Belvidere for the two-month duration of a job there? Will he con-
sider himself fairly treated if the first man pays lower taxes on the same
wages? Will fie really feel richer than the first man? This kind of ques-
tion is extremely difficult to answer and requires a good deal of intuition
and speculation. I suspect that the third man's attitudes would depend
on how common it is for construction workers to live in mobile homes
and thus on assumptions as to the first man's probable willingness to
take up residence in a mobile home and move to Belvidere for two
months.
The suggestion that what is equitable depends on estimates of the
probable willingness of others to change their location will be borne
out, I believe, by consideration of the case of a long-term job. Suppose
that all the facts are the same but that the first man's job in Belvidere
will last for two years and that he still chooses to live in Chicago, Our
view of what equity demands may now turn on our assumptions about
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the mental process by which the decision to live in Chicago was reached.
On the one hand, we might assume that the taxpayer was strongly
committed to living in Chicago and that he never seriously entertained
the possibility of moving; in other words, that the choice was virtually
the same as if the job were to last for only two months. On the other
hand, we might assume that the choice between remaining in Chicago
or moving to Belvidere was a close one. The same possibilities exist
as in the case of a two-month job. The difference between our attitudes
toward the short-term and long-term jobs seems to lie in our assump-
tions as to the taxpayer's mental process in each case. No doubt these
assumptions are based on our feelings about how we ourselves would
react. When the job is of short duration most people probably would
not consider moving to the job site a reasonable alternative. When the
job is of longer duration the opposite is probably true; avoidance of the
commuting expense becomes a real possibility and the amount spent
on commuting, if commuting is elected, becomes an amount that was
at the disposal of the taxpayer. To the extent that we deny deductibility
in accordance with this kind of assumption, we achieve equity only in
those cases in which the assumption is valid; we achieve only rough
justice. For administrative reasons we may not be able to do any better,
but we should be prepared to feel some uneasiness about cases such as
Flowers in which the facts seem to place in doubt the assumption of
flexibility of home location in the long run. In any event, it seems that
such flexibility is the critical issue; duration of the job is merely an
indicator of its presence. If we say that we are not concerned with
idiosyncratic attitudes toward home location, we are responding not to
equity but to administrability or to irritation with deviance and the
problems it creates.
Our conclusions about the equity of allowing a deduction for com-
muting expenses may be affected not only by'our assumptions concern-
ing the flexibility of home and job location but also by other factors,
such as the costs and preferences that influence the taxpayer's decision,
and by the proposition that, although our tax system does not generally
take account of psychic benefits, strong equitable arguments can be
made for doing so. Without purporting to exhaust the variations pre-
sented in the complex and subtle world of reality, it is useful to examine
at least a few prototypes that include some of these additional variables.
Suppose that two lawyers, A and B, work side by side in downtown
Chicago and receive the same income, that neither of them considers
the possibility of working elsewhere to be a reasonable alternative, that
both have roughly similar preferences for residential location, that
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both would be willing to live in either the city or the suburbs but, all
other things being equal, would choose the suburbs by a significant,
margin, that the basic costs of acceptable housing in the city and in the.
suburbs are the same, and that commuting to the suburbs would cost,
$500 per year. Now suppose that this $500 is just enough to induce A
to live in the city, while it is not quite enough to deter B from locating
in the suburbs. This case clearly justifies the view that commuting ex-
penses should not be deductible. B uses part of his income to achieve
something that is a satisfaction to him-living in the suburbs. A fore-
goes that satisfaction and has $500 extra with which he may either
satisfy his craving for the bucolic scene by taking vacations in the
country or buy something else that pleases him. The cost of A's vaca-
tions bears only the remotest connection to his business activity and
thus can fairly be characterized as purely personal expense, with no
reasonable claim to deductibility. The nondeductibility of B's commut-
ing expense then, by comparison, is easily understood. B's case seems
less clear if we compare him to a lawyer with the same preference for
the suburbs who decides to work in the suburbs or who has an inde-
pendent income and avoids commuting expenses simply because he
does not work at all. But since working in the suburbs or living on an
independent income is relatively rare, the comparison to A seems more
relevant.
Next, consider the same A-B facts with two changes: first, that A
greatly prefers living in the city and, second, that the cost of housing.
in the suburbs is $500 less per year than the cost of comparable housing.
in the city, so that B's total living cost, including commuting expenses,
is the same as A's. This is another easy case. A and B are both living.
where they are happiest, and their costs are the same. Plainly a deduc-
tion for B's commuting expense would produce inequity.
But now return to the original assumption that the cost of housing
in the city and the suburbs is the same, so that, while both A and B are
living where they would want to live in the absence of jobs, B's total
costs of living where he desires are higher by the amount of his com-
muting expense. This comparison is much like that of the two skier-
lawyers living respectively in Aspen and Chicago, but is not precisely
the same. In the case of the skier from Chicago it is not possible to say
with much assurance that but for his job he would have lived in Aspen.
For purposes of the earlier analysis we assumed that the two skiers had
roughly similar preferences, but it seems unlikely that this kind of
similarity will often be found. Thus it seems reasonable to assume, for
the purposes of developing a general rule, that the Aspen lawyer's
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easy access to skiing is one of a bundle of psychic benefits that cannot
be measured and must be presumed to be no greater than the bundle
of psychic benefits that the Chicago lawyer derives from living in Chi-
cago. The latter's ski trips can then reasonably be regarded as an addi-
tional satisfaction purchased with his additional income. In other
words, it may be reasonable to presume that each individual lives where
he is most content and that while, for example, the Chicago lawyer
must pay to get to a good ski grea, the Aspen lawyer would have to pay
to get to the museums, concerts, political conventions, and other attrac-
tions available to Chicagoans. But if we apply the same presumption to
A and B-that each derives the same total satisfaction from his choice
of residential location, so that no special allowance is required to ac-
count for a particular advantage of one locale over another-then it
may be said that the relevant difference between the commuter and
the noncommuter is simply the cost of the commute. If we then say
that the tax system should, whete feasible, account for differences in the
cost of achieving equal positions, deductibility of the commuting cost
is indicated.
This last point is sufficiently elusive to warrant a restatement in
somewhat different terms. We start with the proposition that each in-
dividual is confronted with a different, complex set of potential psychic
satisfactions that can be achieved at different costs and that as a result
one person may have at his disposal, after achievement of certain "basic"
satisfactions, greater resources than another person with the same in-
come. For example, one man's idea of the day-to-day good life may be
to come home at night and watch television, while his income counter-
part may find comparable satisfaction only with concerts, the theater,
and night clubs. Generally, we ignore this kind of difference for the
fairly obvious reason that it is not feasible to account for it. Nonethe-
less, it may be proper, and feasible, to segregate from the total bundle
of psychic satisfactions one particular item, residential location, and try
to account for it separately. The justification for doing so is that the
costliness of achieving other satisfactions may be a factor randomly dis,
tributed throughout the population of taxpayers, while the achieve-
ment of residential location satisfaction requires expenditure by only
those taxpayers who are tied to a particular job location. This last
observation does not directly support the conclusion that commuting
costs should be deductible; it does directly support the conclusion that
such costs may reasonably be taken into account separately from the
costs of achieving other satisfactions. Having reached this conclusion,
we can, by posing two questions, proceed to the issue of whether a
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deduction should be allowed. First, is it generally true that people live
where they prefer without regard to cost and derive roughly equal, or
at least randomly distributed, satisfactions from their residential loca-
tions? Second, is it generally true that the cost of housing in areas in,
which most people must commute to work is not .less than the cost of-
comparable housing in areas in which commuting cost is insubstantial?
Only if both these questions are answered affirmatively is there a rea-
sonable basis for arguing that the criterion of equity justifies deduction
of commuting costs, This is not to say that such cost should be deduct-
ible because it can be called a business rather than a personal expense;
rather it is to avoid that blind-alley issue. Nor is it to say that the deduc-
tion is required under any reasonable definition of the concept of tax
equity; a reasonably defensible concept of equity could consciously ex-
clude all efforts to account for the differences in costs of achieving equal
satisfactions on the ground that tax equity has nothing to do with satis-
factions or well-being, But it is not unreasonable to argue that com
muting costs are analogous to other costs that are allowed as deductions,
such as the medical expense22 and the casualty loss.23 The dominant
characteristics of these costs seem to be that they maintain the status
quo and are nonvolitional. An expenditure for medical treatment does,
in a short-term view, buy a satisfaction: relief from illness. But in the
long-run view that most people ultimately take of such an expenditure,
it achieves nothing more than a maintenance of the status quo deter-
mined by reference to the normal condition of the usually healthy
majority of the population. Moreover, even though rich people may
spend more on the cure of a given illness than not-so-rich people, most
people probably look upon amounts spent for medical treatment as
being beyond their control. Similarly, if one's house is destroyed by
fire and he feels he must replace it, the expenditure24 merely returns
him to the status quo before the fire. And the difficulty of giving up a
way of life to which one has become accustomed may make the decision
to replace the house seem essentially involuntary.25 If we have properly
isolated the dominant general characteristics of the medical expense and
22 INT. RiEV. COIE OF 1954, § 213,
23 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 165(c)(3).
24 The casualty loss deduction is actually for the amount of the loss, not the amount
of the replacement cost. Replacement cost, however, is usually the best measure of the
amount bf loss, and the substitution seems wartanted,
25 In certain cases the deduction can be justified in terms of maintenance of the
status quo and involuntariness by looking directly at the loss. For example, consider the
case of a man whose pay envelope is stolen from him on his way home from work, This
latter case also more dearly supports the somewhat questionable underlying assumption
of the casualty loss deduction, that the loss is out of current income rather than capital.
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casualty loss deductions, commuting expenses exhibit the same char-
acteristics, once the assumptions of equal satisfactions and different
costs are made, and should also be deductible. 26 On these -assumptions
the commuting expense does not result in any satisfaction or improved
position in relation to what we consider the relevant standard of com-
parison. And the commuting expense is equally nonvolitional once it is
assumed that job location is fixed and that everyone lives where he is
most content to live.
Analysis of commuting expense in terms of costs of achieving equal
satisfaction confirms the conclusion reached earlier by a different mode
of analysis, 27 that the commuting expenses of construction workers with
short-term jobs should be deductible. Among such a population the
assumption that satisfaction with residential location is equally or at
least randomly distributed seems virtually inescapable. Moreover, job
location either is beyond control or involves considerations that make
commuting expenses involuntary. Thus the expenditure meets the two
standards that argue for the equity of deductibility.
The effort to resolve the problem of commuting expense by refer-
ence to satisfactions and costs is less tidy than resolution by application
of concepts of causation, but it has been demonstrated that causation
simply cannot be treated as the relevant issue when, as here, it is clear
that the expense required the concurring existence of both a sub-
stantial deduction-generating condition (the choice of job) and a sub-
stantial nondeduction-generating condition (the choice of residential
location). The futility of reference to concepts of causation in resolving
such problems is illustrated in other tax contexts as well, and it will be
instructive to examine one of these to test the utility of the analysis
offered here. In United States v. Gilmore,28 the taxpayer claimed a
26 It is not, of course, self-evident that there should be a deduction for casualty losses
or even for medical expenses. The casualty loss deduction may unjustly discriminate
among the unlucky; after all, the man who has just lost his house in a fire could be com-
pared to a man who has been a consistent loser at poker and who, as a result, has never
had enough money to buy a house. And perhaps it is not self-evident that an expenditure
for medical treatment does not procure any personal satisfaction. The opposite may be
true, to take an extreme example, in the case of a man who gains satisfaction from viewing
himself as one for whom nothing but the best is good enough and who may find an
opportunity to achieve such satisfaction in being attended by highly trained, highly re-
spected, and highly paid specialists. In light of such possibilities, it may be that the wisest
tax policy is the one that most rigorously avoids taking account of psychic losses or
psychic gains. Yet the deductions for medical expenses and for casualty losses seem to
appeal to the public's or at least Congress's sense of fairness or equity; they therefore
seem to be within the realm of reasonable policy.
27 See pp. 882-83 supra.
28 372 U.S. 39 (1963).
[Vol. 54:871
COMMUTING EXPENSES
deduction for legal expenses incurred in connection with a suit for
divorce. The total legal expenses were approximately $40,000,-but only
$8,000 was allocable to the job of ending the marriage; the remaining
$32,000 was allocable to the successful effort to defeat his wife's claim
to what he regarded as his property and to his effort to protect his
reputation in order to preserve his business as an autombbile dealer.
The Court of Claims allowed a deduction for the $32,000 under what
is now section 212 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, which pro-
vides for the deduction of expenses "incurred... for the conservation
... of property held for the production of income." The Supreme
Court reversed. Most of its opinion seems consistent only with the
view that the Court considered the expenses in question to be "personal"
and that this was the reason for the result.29 Assuming tliat this is a
proper reading of the opinion, why did the Court view the expense as
"personal"? Some of the Court's language suggests that it relied on
vague concepts of causation. Thus it stated that the outcome turned on
"the origin and character of the claim with respect to which [the] ex-
pense was incurred."80 Analysis in these terms of the Gilmore problem
is no more enlightening than it is in commuting expense problems.
The acquisition and ownership of the property was as much a neces-
sary antecedent of the expense as was the institution of the divorce
proceeding and the wife's claim to the property. The latter factor was
more immediate in time, but the relevance of that observation is not
apparent. There is other language in the opinion suggesting that the
expense was not deductible because litigating a divorce case is not a
29 It is difficult to determine predsely what the Court's rationale was. The govern-
ment "contended that the expense . . . must be deemed nondeductible 'personal' or
'family' expense ... not deductible expense under [§ 212]." Id. at 44. The Court said, "For
reasons given hereafter we think the Government's position is sound and that it must be
sustained," id., and "Thus none of [the taxpayer's] expenditures in resisting [his wife's
claims to community property] can be deemed 'business' expenses and they are therefore not
deductible under [§ 212]." Id. at 52. In the very next paragraph, however, the Court went
on to state:
In view of this conclusion it is unnecessary to consider the further question
suggested by the Government: whether that portion of respondent's payments
attributable to litigating the issue of the existence of community property was
a capital expenditure or a personal expense. In neither event would these pay-
ments be deductible from gross income.
Id. Since a capital expenditure is a category of "business" as opposed to "personal" outlay,
or is at least property-related, and since the Court had in the earlier passages indicated
that the expenses in issue were either personal or business expenses, this last statement
is extremely difficult to understand. But see Gilmore v. United States, 245 F. Supp. 383
(N.D. Calif. 1965), holding that the expenses were capital expenditures, increasing taxpayers'
tax basis for the property that was subject to the conflicting claims in the divorce action.
30 372 U.S. at 49. See Klein, supra note 17, at 1109 n.31.
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Court may/Lave intended to rest its conclusion on the vague notion that
litigating a divorce action is not normally thought of as part of one's
investment-management life and, on an inference from this character-
ization, that Congress simply, would not have thought that the expenses
of such litigation should be deductible as investment-management ex-
penses. This possible rationale may represent a respectable interpreta-
tion of the statute, particularly in light of the legislative history to
which the Court referred,32 but it casts no light on the question whether
the result can be justified in terms of reasonable tax policy. Indeed, one
can question whether this version of the Court's rationale is anything
more than a fuzzed-up man-in-the-street version of causative analysis.
To say that the expense in issue in Gilmore is an expense of litigating
a divorce action is to beg the question by assuming erroneously that it
was the divorce, not the ownership of property, that was the sole "cause"
of the part of the litigation that gave-rise to, the expense.
Let us turn, then, to the previously developed notions of personal
satisfaction and voluntariness of expense, trying to determine whether
analysis in those terms can remove the sense of confused futility asso-
ciated with analysis by reference to the abstruse and unenlightening
concepts of causation relied upon by the Court;33 Does the litigation ex-
pense procure a satisfaction? As with medical expenses and casualty
losses, the answer depends on the perspective. At the time of the divorce
action, it is clear that the expense procures a significant satisfaction of
sorts in the form of a relief from an unhappy relationship-just as
medical expense buys relief from illness. But if one looks farther back
31 For example, the Court stated, "For in context 'conservation of property' seems
to refer to operations performed with respect to the property itself . .. rather than to a
taxpayer's retention of ownership in it." 372 U.S. at 44. Later the Court observed that
deductibility "of the litigation eosts of resisting a elaim depends On whether or not the
claim arises in connection with the taxpayer's profit-seeking activities," 872 U.S. at 48
(emphasis by the Court).
32 872 U.S. at 44-45. The reader who has gotten this far will, I assume, understand
that this is not the kind of issue with which the present atticle is concerned,
33 The problenm cannot utefully be anayzed by means of the fixed-variable approach
applied earlier. That method of analysis is helpful only where it can reasonably be
expected that the dedtictibility of the exRpense might have some effect On the decision
whether that expense will be incurred. In the present case it cannot reasonably be supposed
that the decision to marry (or to seek a divorce, had the taxpayer initiated the action) or
the decision to accumulate wealth could be affected in any significant manner by the
deductibility of the kind of expense involved in Gilmore. It seems appropriate, therefore,
to take as fixed, rather than variable, both the decision to marry (or divorce) and the
decision to accumulate wealth.
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to the time when the litigant was in a state of either blissful marriage
or idyllic bachelorhood, it can be said that the divorce action, like
medical treatment or repair of casualty loss, merely helps to restore
the normal status quo ante and therefore should not be considered the
purchase of a satisfaction.4-The latter perspective-assumes that the
proper standard of comparison for the individual involved in a divorce
action is people in a state of contented marriage or bachelorhood, just
as the deduction for medical expenses or casualty losses assumes that
the proper standard for comparison is those individuals who have not
been struck by illness or casualty. This latter assumption and, therefore,
the latter perspective, does seem the more appropriate one, though it
must be conceded that this conclusion seems to rest largely on emotion
and intuition.
What about control or volition? Is litigating a divorce case a voli-
tional act? The predetermined personal factors that affect the choice are
likely to weigh so heavily as to make it sensible to say that there really
is no practical choice. To most people, however, a decision to seek a
divorce is not likely to seem as clearly nonvolitional as a decision to
seek medical treatment. My guess is that the general public would be
more likely to expect that sickness in a marriage can be cured by an
act of will-a change in attitude, if you prefer-than to expect that a
bodily malfunction can be willed into or out of existence, Christian
Science and much of modern psychosomatic medicine to the contrary
notwithstanding. Thus the expense in Gilmore is one for which neither
the claim to deductibility nor the decision disallowing the deduction
seems wholly outrageous.
One final observation about the Gilmore problem will cast further
light on the previously developed analytic scheme. If we argue that the
litigation expenses incident to a divorce action should be deductible
merely because of the absence of satisfaction and control, we have
established no foundation for limiting the deduction to that part of the
expenses allocable to protection of property. But a further consideration
might support such a limitation-the element of randomness. It may be
reasonable to assume that the expense of ending a marriage is randomly
distributed throughout the population of taxpayers, or that it is at
least unpredictably distributed, which as a practical matter amounts
34 This assumes, of course, that a personal battle, as part of a judicial proceeding,
is something that very few individuals would relish or look upon as a source of satisfaction,
even before the advent of any of the events giving rise to the battle. This assumption
may be unvarranted, and the possibility that it is may again suggest (cf. p. 889 supra)
the wisdom of a tax policy that rigorously eschews accounting for psychic gains and losses.
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to the same thing. This is not true, however, of the property-defense
expense involved in Gilmore; that kind of expense occurs only among
the segment of the taxpaying population that owns property. This fac-
tor may be just enough to tip the scales. As to the general-expenses of
ending a marriage we can take a let-the-chips-fall-where-they-may atti-
tude. But we cannot take the same attitude when we know that the chips
will fall on only one class of people. This is not to say that property
ownership is significant because of its relation to income; to take that
position would be to fall into the trap of causal reasoning. It is merely
to say that because property ownership is not randomly distributed,
but is a necessary condition for the incurring of the expense, the ex-
pense in question may reasonably be separated from the great mass of
those expenses of meeting misfortune that may befall any of us.
IV
ADMINISTRABILITY
Having analyzed the commuting expense problem in terms of
economic neutrality and equity we come to the final criterion, admin-
istrability. In terms of the first two criteria our conclusions may turn
on whether we assume that the job or the home location is fixed or
variable, but it is not feasible from an administrative standpoint to
determine this issue on an individual basis.35 The criterion of admin-
istrability requires that any rules we develop in response to the fixed-
variable analysis must be based not on actual circumstances in individ-
ual cases but rather on assumptions as to the probabilities in a given
class of cases. For example, it would not be feasible to ask whether an
individual construction worker with a short-term job regarded his home
as fixed and his job as variable, but it would be feasible to administer a
rule that the abnormal expenses of commuting to a job expected to last
less than a year are deductible. Such a rule would be justified by the
assumption that among the class of workers with such jobs it is almost
always true that the home location is not variable.
35 Indeed, a rule that made mental processes relevant to deductibility might make
such a finding impossible. Consider the Flowers case again. If a man like Flowers is
confronted with a rule denying deduction of his commuting expense and if, in the face
of this rule, he decides to incur a substantial commuting expense, it is reasonable to
assume that in his view his home location is fixed. If, on the other hand, a deduction for
commuting expense were allowed, we would have no practical means of determining what
he would do in the absence of the prospect of the deduction; in other words, we would




The principal purpose of this article has been to develop analytic'
tools and insights, hopefully with some relevance beyond the imme-"
diate context, not to fashion proposals for changes in the law. A few
modest suggestions for change may nonetheless serve to summarize
and make more concrete some of the ideas that have been expressed.
The one area in which the preceding analysis shows a clear need
for change is that of the short-term job requiring an abnormally long
and expensive commute. From the standpoint of both economic neu-
trality and equity, the expense of such commuting ought to be deduct-
ible. Administrative considerations dictate a rather arbitrary rule-
for example, one allowing the deduction of the amount of any com-.
muting expense allocable to transporting oneself beyond a radius of
ten miles from one's home for any person with a job expected to last
less than one year. Such a rule might produce some unintended bene-
fits; for example, it would allow a deduction to a man who would have
lived fifty miles from his job even if it had been permanent. These
unintended benefits could be partially foreclosed by limiting the deduc-
tion to the miles traveled in excess of the distance between the last
permanent job and the home at the time that job was held. But such
a rule would probably accomplish too little to justify the complexity
of administering it.
Another possible change would be to exclude from income any
compensation for commuting paid by an employer. Surely if an em-
ployer does not expect his employee to move closer to the job site,
believes that commuting expense is a relevant consideration, and backs
his appraisal by making payments that cannot be regarded as normal
compensation, because not available to all employees, the tax system
can accept that appraisal. To preclude an exclusion for compensation
disguised as reimbursement for commuting, the exclusion would have
to be limited to cases in which the amount paid was tailored to the
employee's actual expense.
The working wife also deserves a break. All of her commuting
expense should be deductible because she has no control over where
she lives in relation to her job, but is usually free to decide whether
to work and, if so, where. Again, a simple rule might produce somre
unintended benefits; for example, it would allow a deduction to the
woman whose decisions as to home and job location would have- been
the same even if she had not been married. Some of these benefits might
1969]
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
be eliminated by rules that could be framed in wholly objective terms.
But none have occurred to me that would have a sufficiently significant
effect to justify the complexity that they would add.
A more questionable suggestion is a deduction for commuting
expenses for all low-income people.36 The issumption underlying this
suggestion is that people with low incomes cannot make home-location
decisions that procure substantial psychic satisfactions; at best, they
can purchase only subsistence. If they live far from their jobs, it is
presumably because they have no choice about where to live. Accord-
ingly, the commuting expense buys no satisfaction and is involuntary.
Thus deductibility can be defended not only as a device for helping
the poor but also as a means of achieving equity and economic neutral-
ity. There is precedent for this proposal in section 214 of the present
Code. Under that provision a woman or a widower is allowed to deduct
up to $900 of the cost of child care, but the deduction is reduced by
the amount by which her income and her husband's exceeds $6,000 per
year. The same approach could be used for commuting expenses.
These suggestions are limited in scope. They would of course be
subsumed by a general rule allowing the deduction of all commuting
expenses. Whether such a general rule should be adopted depends,
according to my analysis, on assumptions about matters of fact, and we
lack information that would permit us to make these assumptions with
any sense of assurance. For example, the strongest case for deductibility
could be made if it were assumed that for most of the taxpaying popula-
tion (1) home location is determined by personal factors that operate
so strongly as to make commuting cost largely irrelevant, (2) individual
home locations provide roughly similar satisfactions, (3) the costs of
comparable housing are roughly the same at different locations, and
(4) there are fairly wide choices as to job location. On these assumptions
both the criterion of equity and the criterion of economic neutrality
support deductibility. But in the absence of any sound basis for making
these assumptions, it seems appropriate to accept the existing rules.
Any studies that produced reliable information on the economic and
psychological factors specified here would be relevant to tax policy, but
it is beyond the scope of this article to consider even the feasibility of
such studies.
80 The issue of a commuting expense deduction for the poor arises quite clearly in
drafting incomedetermination rules for a fiegative income tax. This article is iti pai-t an
outgrowth of a discussion of such rules among members of the University of Wisconsin
Institute for Research on Poverty, which drafted rules for a negative income tax experi-
hiefit now undetway in New Jersey.
